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ABSTRACT	
Law	and	regulation	increasingly	interact	with	science,	technology,	and	medicine	in	
contemporary	society.	Law	and	social	science	(LSS)	analyses	can	therefore	benefit	
from	rigorous,	nuanced	social	scientific	accounts	of	the	nature	of	scientific	knowledge	
and	practice.	Over	the	past	two	decades,	LSS	scholars	have	increasingly	turned	for	
such	accounts	to	the	field	known	as	science	and	technology	studies	(STS).	This	essay	
reviews	the	LSS	literature	that	draws	on	STS.	Our	discussion	is	divided	into	two	
primary	sections.	We	first	discuss	LSS	literature	that	draws	on	STS	because	it	deals	
with	issues	in	which	law	and	science	interact.	We	then	discuss	literature	that	draws	on	
STS	because	it	sees	law	as	analogous	to	science	as	a	knowledge-producing	institution	
amenable	to	social	science	analysis.	We	suggest	that	through	both	these	avenues	STS	
can	encourage	a	newly	critical	view	within	LSS	scholarship.		 	
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INTRODUCTION		 In	promoting	the	case	method	and	professional	development	that	form	the	cornerstones	of	American	legal	education	today,	jurist	and	legal	scholar	Christopher	Columbus	Langdell	declared	that	law	must	be	regarded	as	nothing	less	than	a	science,	that	the	library	was	to	be	the	lawyer’s	laboratory:	“all	that	the	laboratories	of	the	university	are	to	the	chemists	and	the	physicists,	the	museum	of	natural	history	to	the	zoologists,	the	botanical	garden	to	the	botanists.”		Indeed,	Langdell	cautioned,	“[i]f	law	be	not	a	science,	a	university	will	best	consult	its	own	dignity	in	declining	to	teach	it”	(Langdell	1887,	p.	124).	This	was	more	than	poetry;	it	was	an	attempt	to	elevate	law	by	placing	it	on	par	with	what	was	then	an	almost-universally	accepted	paradigm	of	objective	truth:	science	(Schweber	1999).	Although	law	today	does	not	always	reflect	Langdell’s	scientizing	program,	it	has	not	been	banished	from	universities,	nor	has	it	relinquished	its	claims	to	produce	a	form	of	truth:	factual	truths	about	individual	cases,	rather	than	science’s	more	general	truths.	Indeed,	many	have	observed	that	law	and	science	may	be	the	two	most	powerful	truth-producing	institutions	in	contemporary	society.	This	presumption	has	generated	interest	in	the	interaction	between	these	two	institutions,	prompting	inquiry	into	instances	when	they	clash	and	when	they	cooperate.	Historically,	many	discussions	of	the	interaction	between	law	and	science	have	echoed	Langdell’s	admiration	for	natural	scientists,	scientific	knowledge,	and	
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institutions.		Alongside	this	favorable	idea	of	science	remains	a	critique	of	lawyers’	purported	misunderstanding—even	misuse—of	science.		Scientists’	misunderstanding	of	law	seems	to	be	less	of	a	concern,	discussed	perhaps	only	for	diplomatic	reasons.	Thus,	one	way	for	the	Law	and	Social	Science	(LSS)	scholar	to	explore	this	intersection	is	to	seek	edification	from	natural	scientists,	scientific	knowledge,	and	scientific	institutions.	Through	such	an	approach,	law	can	be	critiqued	for	its	poor	understanding	of	scientific	information.	In	such	formulations,	scientific	knowledge	generally	is	treated	as	stable	and	unambiguous;	the	problem	lies	in	law’s	use	of	it.	These	arguments	rest	upon	an	assumption	that	“correct”	scientific	information	can	be	discerned	and	accessed.	Such	assumptions	rest,	in	turn,	on	claims	about	scientific	method	or	scientific	authority	that	purportedly	can	be	used	to	easily	sort	“real”	science	from	pseudo-science	(e.g.,	Faigman	1999,	Foster	&	Huber	1999).	Some	useful	work	has	come	out	of	this	approach,	for	example	in	exposing	the	failure	of	courts	to	regulate	forensic	science	(Saks	&	Faigman	2008).		However,	another	way	for	the	LSS	scholar	to	explore	the	interaction	between	law	and	science	is	to	engage	with	fellow	social	scientists	who	study	science,	technology,	or	medicine,	as	the	LSS	scholar	studies	law.	Over	the	past	two	decades	or	so,	some	LSS	scholars	have	become	cognizant	of	the	existence	of	a	community	of	social	scientists,	much	like	themselves,	who	are	dedicated	to	the	study	of	science	and	technology	as	social	phenomena,	much	in	the	way	that	LSS	approaches	law	as	a	social	phenomenon.		This	focus	on	sociality	challenges	traditional	conceptions	of	law	and	science	as	confined	to	institutions,	isolated	from	the	norms	and	values	that	
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motivate	most	of	human	interaction.		Science-in-action	(Latour	1987),	like	law-in-action,	has	become	a	popular	buzzword,	and	signals	an	approach	to	the	study	of	science	and	technology	that	takes	into	account	not	only	science	and	its	impact	on	society,	but	also	the	communities	of	people	and	things	that	comprise	and	enact	science	itself.			 We	refer	to	the	community	of	social	scientists	who	study	science	and	technology	and	society	as	“STS.”	This	is	an	intentionally	ambiguous	acronym	that	can	usefully	distinguish	a	particular	school	of	social	scientific	approaches	to	science	and	technology	(for	an	introduction,	see	Sismondo	2004)	from	the	full	panoply	of	approaches,	including,	for	example,	plenty	of	excellent	scholarly	work	on	the	nature	of	scientific	knowledge	that	would	disavow	the	STS	label,	notably	much	philosophy	of	science	(Haack	2003).	Our	topic	in	this	essay	is	specifically	the	impact	of	the	particular	school	of	scholarship	labeled	STS	on	LSS.		 Engagement	with	STS	will	take	the	LSS	scholar	down	a	different	path	than	the	traditional	law-and-science	approach	described	above.	Rather	than	seeing	science	as	clear	and	unproblematic,	STS	suggests	that	the	LSS	scholar	should	expect	to	find	science	messy,	unclear,	and	unresolved.	Indeed,	we	suggest	that	it	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	find	occasions	where	the	law	can	apprehend	science	as	a	stable,	uncontested	entity.	Instead,	the	LSS	scholar	will	have	to	treat	science	as	just	as	unstable	and	contested	as	law.	Indeed,	STS	scholars	would	question	the	very	premise	of	Langdell’s	vision	discussed	above.	They	would	challenge	“the	possibility,	and	desirability,	of	law	becoming	‘more	scientific’	or	being	made	more	
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‘authoritative’	through	incorporating	scientific	claims	or	mimicking	its	epistemic	norms”	(Cloatre	&	Pickersgill	2015,	p.	3).	
STS			 While	STS,	like	any	other	academic	field,	encompasses	a	wide	range	of	ideas	and	approaches,	the	acronym	may	reasonably	be	interpreted	to	refer	broadly	to	a	social	scientific	approach	to	studying	science	that	arose	in	the	1970s	and	continues	to	thrive	today.	It	can	claim	the	customary	trappings	of	those	academic	fields,	like	LSS	itself,	whose	status	rests	somewhere	between	a	topic,	movement,	school,	and	discipline—what	may	be	described	as	a	“semi-autonomous	social	field”	(Moore	1973)	or,	simply,	a	“site”	for	the	study	of	social	action	(Seron	&	Silbey	2004).	Like	LSS,	STS	claims	disciplinary	societies	(e.g.,	the	Society	for	Social	Studies	of	Science	and	the	European	Association	for	the	Study	of	Science	and	Technology),	journals	(e.g.,	Social	Studies	of	Science	and	Science,	Technology	&	Human	Values),	and	so	on.	It	has	had	less	success	in	establishing	itself	institutionally	as	a	discipline	in	universities.	In	most	universities,	it	tends	to	exist	more	on	the	level	of	a	program	than	a	department.		 STS	broadly	derived	from	a	number	of	converging	intellectual	threads,	including	Fleck	(1979)	and	Kuhn’s	(1962)	history	of	science,	Wittgenstein’s	(1953)	philosophy,	Berger	and	Luckmann’s	(1966)	social	constructivism,	ethnomethodology	(Lynch	2001),	Mannheim’s	(1936)	sociology,	cultural	anthropology	(Franklin	1995),	and	others.	It	defined	itself	in	opposition	to	what	it	perceived	as	old	and	outmoded	approaches	to	science	and	technology.	STS	distinguished	itself	from	these	“older”	approaches	by	claiming	to	study	science	
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empirically	as	it	actually	was,	as	opposed,	perhaps	most	notably,	to	philosophers’	interest	in	what	science	ought	to	be,	i.e.,	epistemology.	Some	early	STS	scholars	used	qualitative	social	science	tools,	including	ethnography,	to	try	to	capture	the	actual	making	of	scientific	knowledge.	Again,	this	observation	of	science	“in	action,”	rather	than	in	the	literature	may	be	seen	as	parallel	to	similar	moves	in	LSS	to	distinguish	“real”	law	from	law-in-books.	STS	initially	defined	itself	broadly	as	constructivist,	by	which	it	meant	that	scientific	knowledge	and	technological	artifacts	and	systems	were	at	some	level	made	by	human	social	actors.	STS	scholars	such	as	Shapin	and	Schaffer	(1985)	and	Collins	(1981)	distilled	this	interest	into	a	methodological	principle	by	which	STS	scholarship	committed	to	explaining	scientific	knowledge	as	a	purely	social	phenomenon.	One	could	not	explain	scientific	belief	merely	by	saying	it	was	true;	scientific	belief	could	only	come	about	socially	through	sets	of	well	coordinated,	if	tacit,	professionally	developed	habits	of	interaction	and	discourse.			This	was	consistent	with	a	broad	strand	of	social	constructivism	across	academia,	and	STS	may	be	seen	as	one	facet	of	the	broader	movement	to	apply	relativism	and	constructivism	to	more	or	less	anything.	However,	because	this	approach	was	applied	to	what	is	undoubtedly	the	most	epistemically	privileged	social	institution—science—STS	may	be	seen	as,	in	some	sense,	the	most	radical	strand	of	these	movements.	The	claim	that	scientific	knowledge	was	socially	constructed	provoked	antagonism	from	practicing	natural	scientists,	realist	philosophers,	and	others	who	caricatured	the	social	construction	of	scientific	knowledge	as	a	claim	that	one	could	even	choose	to	defy	gravity	(e.g.,	Sokal	&	
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Bricmont	1998).	Because	STS,	like	LSS,	engages	in	“studying	up”	(Nader	1972)—inverting	the	common	social	science	tendency	to	study	the	disenfranchised	and	powerless	(e.g.,	deviants	for	sociologists,	indigenous	peoples	for	anthropologists)	to	instead	encourage	the	social	scientist	to	study	people	and	institutions	more	powerful	than	herself—these	“science	wars”	(Ross	1996)	were	potentially	detrimental	to	the	field’s	health.	Yet	STS	has	flourished,	and	its	commitment	to	investigating	the	sociality	of	science	launched	a	number	of	programmatic	research	efforts,	some	of	which	are	still	associated	with	STS	today:	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge	(SSK),	the	strong	programme,	and	the	Edinburgh	School	(Bloor	1991);	the	Bath	School	(Callon	&	Latour	1992,	Collins	&	Yearley	1992),	the	Empirical	Program	in	Relativism	(EPOR)	(Collins	1981),	the	social	construction	of	technology	(SCOT)	(Bijker	et	al	1987),	and	so	on.	A	more	modest	reading	of	STS	may	be	that	it	denotes	simply	a	preference	for	studying	the	role	that	social	relations	play	in	the	construction	of	scientific	knowledge	over	studying	the	impact	of	science	and	technology	on	society.	This	preference	is	significant	because	the	very	phrase	“science,	technology	and	society”	had	until	the	1970s	referred	to	precisely	these	sorts	of	“impact”	inquiries,	which	could	be	treated	as	matters	for	ethics,	policy,	and	so	on.	STS	found	law	before	LSS	found	STS.	Early	STS	researchers	studied	interactions	between	science	and	law.	By	the	1990s,	there	was	enough	STS	work	on	law	to	make	it	a	canonical	STS	topic.	Although	Jasanoff	(2008)	covers	STS	work	on	law,	we	endeavor	to	cover	LSS	work	that	draws	on	STS.	Interested	readers	should	
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also	note	Silbey’s	(2008a,	2008b)	collection	of	reprints	of	LSS	scholarship	on	science.		 By	the	time	of	the	period	under	discussion	in	this	essay—approximately	1994	through	the	present—STS	had	moved	well	beyond	the	project	of	demonstrating	the	social	construction	of	scientific	knowledge.	Although	many	natural	scientists	doubtless	remain	unconvinced,	the	constructed	nature	of	scientific	knowledge	long	has	been	taken	for	granted	within	STS	and	is	no	longer	questioned	or	even	considered	interesting.	The	field	has	since	moved	in	a	dizzying	array	of	different	directions—thick	ethnography,	politics,	literary	theory,	activist	intervention,	design,	and	art	(to	name	just	a	few)—and	in	this	way	has	undoubtedly	lost	a	certain	degree	of	coherence.	Despite	this	(or	perhaps	because	of	it),	STS	has	acquired	a	certain	cachet	in	the	academy.	Scholars	across	a	wide	variety	of	disciplines	now	draw	on,	or	mention,	STS.	In	was	in	this	context	that	LSS	found	STS.	Levi	and	Valverde	(2008,	p.	812)	claim	that	Riles’s	(2000)	“pioneering	application	of	actor-network	tools	to	analyze	human	rights	activism	is,	to	our	knowledge,	the	first	major	sociolegal	work	to	use”	actor-network	theory	(ANT),	a	popular	approach	within	STS,	although	Riles	(2016,	p.	259)	herself	dates	her	exposure	to	STS	earlier,	to	around	1994	[for	more	on	actor-network	theory,	see	below].	Valverde	(2005,	p.	420)	explicitly	dates	the	convergence	of	STS	and	LSS	to	two	panels	at	the	2003	Law	and	Society	Association	(LSA)	conference	in	Vancouver.	One	participant	in	those	panels	(Silbey	2013,	p.	28)	dates	her	engagement	with	STS	to	around	1999	when	she	decided	to	undertake	the	study	of	law	in	scientific	laboratories.	In	any	case,	it	seems	reasonable	to	treat	1994	through	the	present	as	a	
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period	of	“developing	synergies	between	scholarship	in	socio-legal	studies	(SLS)	and	science	and	technology	studies	(STS)”	(Faulkner	et	al	2012,	p.	2).		There	are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	LSS	scholars	have	found	STS	useful	to	them.	In	what	follows,	we	explain	those	ways.	Our	explanation	necessarily	excludes	two	rich	areas	of	convergence	between	LSS	and	STS	that	already	have	been	covered	elsewhere	in	this	journal:	First,	scholars	who	study	law	and	race	commend	STS	for	having	“refuted	the	opposition	of	science	and	power	that	views	science	either	as	a	mere	product	of	politics	or	as	an	apolitical	instrument	capable	of	destroying	false	ideologies	like	racism”	(Roberts	2013,	p.	159).	Second,	those	who	study	environmental	regulation	have	found	STS	useful	because	it	“focus[es]	keenly	on	the	manner	in	which	actors	go	about	promoting,	organizing,	regulating,	and	reacting	to	the	generation	of	knowledge”	(Boyd	et	al	2012,	p.	184).	
STS	Impact	on	LSS	
	 There	are	two	primary	avenues	by	which	LSS	scholars	find	STS,	which	we	label	“interaction”	and	“analogy.”	By	“interaction,”	we	mean	cases	in	which	the	LSS	scholar	examines	an	area	in	which	there	actually	is	interaction	between	law	and	science.	Because	it	is	a	truism	that	the	proportion	of	scientific	issues	in	legal	disputes	is	rapidly	increasing,	there	is	no	shortage	of	areas	in	which	this	approach	may	be	fruitful.	In	seeking	insight	into	the	scientific	issues	in	question,	it	makes	sense	to	the	LSS	scholar	to	draw	on	the	latest	social	scientific	accounts	of	scientific	knowledge	and	practice.	STS	consciously	presents	itself—and	is	characterized	by	others	in	many	contexts—as	“the	latest”	in	this	sense.	It	thus	appeals	to	those	
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seeking	to	incorporate	a	sophisticated,	rather	than	naïve	understanding	of	the	relevant	science	into	an	LSS	analysis.	By	“analogy,”	we	mean	cases	in	which	the	LSS	researcher	may	be	interested	in	the	LSS	project	of	understanding	law	as	a	social	phenomenon	without	any	explicit	interactions	with	science.	For	this	scholar,	STS	is	an	appealing	tool	in	the	social	science	toolkit.	Such	a	scholar	might	turn	naturally	to	STS	because	of	the	plausible	analogy	between	law	and	science	as	social	institutions.	Both	science	and	law	are	powerful	social	institutions	that	make	knowledge—albeit	in	quite	different	ways—and	have	great	epistemic	authority	(Jasanoff	2008,	p.	761,	Silbey	2013,	p.	27).	The	social	analysis	of	both	institutions	comprises	the	vaunted	social	science	practice	of	“studying	up.”	Despite	these	similarities,	the	analogy	is	imperfect	at	best.	Even	today,	the	claim	that	scientific	knowledge	is	socially	constructed	is	still	provocative	in	a	way	that	the	claim	that	law	is	a	social	creation	is	not.	The	relationship	of	STS	and	LSS	to	their	research	subjects	is	different	as	well.	Many	LSS	scholars	are	institutionally	located	in	law	schools.	While	law	professors	are	not	necessarily	practicing	lawyers,	many	LSS	scholars	are	nonetheless	institutionally	located	in	the	very	institution	that	produces	the	knowledge	they	study.	STS	scholars	are	far	more	likely	to	be	located	outside	of	the	primary	institutional	producers	of	the	scientific	knowledge	they	study—that	is,	in	places	other	than	universities’	natural	science	departments.	Thus,	in	the	analog	approach,	the	relationship	between	LSS	and	STS	is	that	of	an	exchange	of	“tools,	methods	and	concepts,	in	order	to	study	their	respective	objects	of	inquiry”	(Jacob	2015,	p.	139)	(see	also	Valverde	2005,	p.	421).	Some	
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scholars	see	the	relationship	less	as	an	exchange	and	more	as	a	conquest	of	LSS	by	an	expansionist	STS,	suggesting	that	law	should	be	yet	another	“‘expansion’	of	the	remit	of	STS”	resulting	in	a	new	field	perhaps	called	“social	studies	of	law”	(Cloatre	&	Pickersgill	2015,	p.	4,	quoting	MacKenzie	in	part)	(see	also	Foster	2014,	Murphy	&	Cuinn	2013).	The	expansionist	impulse	derives	from	a	belief	that	STS	in	fact	constitutes	a	better	way	of	studying	everything,	not	just	science.	But	this	belief	is	not	universally	held	even	within	STS	itself,	where	even	claims	that	STS	constitutes	a	theory	are	contested.			
INTERACTION		
	 Positivist	notions	of	science	remain	dominant	in	contemporary	culture	and	large	swaths	of	academia	as	well.	These	notions	may	be	found	in	much	LSS	work,	especially	when	the	LSS	scholar,	intent	on	analyzing	the	dynamism	in	law,	finds	it	helpful	to	treat	science	as	unambiguous	and	stable.	One	way	in	which	STS	can	inform	LSS	is	when	the	LSS	scholar	exploring	a	problem	that	involves	science	in	law	adopts	instead	a	more	nuanced,	STS-inflected	understanding	of	scientific	knowledge.		We	provide	examples	of	this	below.	
Law	in	the	Laboratory			 The	influence	of	STS	is	evident	in	at	least	two	ways	in	Silbey	and	Ewick’s	(2003)	study	of	the	role	of	law	in	university	science	laboratories.	First,	having	a	deep	understanding	of	the	history	of	the	science	laboratory	from	the	scientific	revolution	through	the	present	enables	them	to	see	the	contemporary	university	laboratory	as	neither	static	nor	inevitable,	but	rather	as	a	particular	formation	of	
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contemporary	society,	in	which	the	laboratory	is	public,	standardized,	and,	in	their	view,	essentially	uninhabited.	Second,	STS’s	focus	on	the	role	of	the	social	in	scientific	knowledge	draws	them	to	study	the	role	of	law	in	shaping	scientific	knowledge	and	what	Shapin	(2008)	calls	“the	scientific	life.”	From	this	perspective,	legal	regulation—health	and	safety	regulations,	animal	protection,	and	so	on—“shaped	the	spaces”	of	university	science	laboratories	“and	thereby	altered	the	professional	lives,	consciousness,	and	passions	of	scientists”	(p.	102;	see	also	Huising	&	Silbey	2011,	Silbey	2006,	Silbey	2009).		
Intellectual	Property		 STS	scholars	have	long	been	fascinated	by	intellectual	property.	The	patent	itself—as	a	univocal,	unambiguous,	and	uncontested	narrative	of	a	scientific	discovery	or	invention—has	long	seemed	a	fertile	site	for	STS	scholars	to	reveal	the	constructed	nature	of	this	narrative	and	more	complex	stories	that	could	be	told.		Some	LSS	scholars	thus	draw	on	STS	to	challenge	simplistic	notions	of	discovery,	invention,	and	authorship,	novelty,	and	patentability		(e.g.,	Biagioli	2011,	Cohen	2012,	Coombe	2011,	Fish	2006,	Hayden	2003,	Kelty	2011,	Murray	2011,	Parthasarathy	2007,	Silbey	2014,	Swanson	2007,	Swanson	2011).	Kahn’s	(2013)	study	of	the	clinical	testing	and	marketing	of	the	congestive	heart	failure	drug	BiDil	draws	on	the	STS	tradition	of	intensive	questioning	of	scientific	claims.	He	shows	that	the	vendor’s	claims	that	the	drug	was	particularly	effective	among	African-Americans,	which	made	it	the	first	drug	approved	by	Food	and	Drug	Administration	for	use	in	a	specific	race,	were	not	only	tenuous	products	of	questionable	interpretations	of	data	that	relied	upon	artificial	constructions	of	“race,”	but	also	
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were	intended	to	extend	the	life	of	the	IP	owner’s	patent.	Burk’s	(2013,	p.	95)	discussion	of	the	fraught	question	of	gene	patenting	evinces	an	STS	sensibility	by	drawing	attention	to	the	essentially	arbitrary	construction	of	the	gene	itself,	an	entity	commonly	presumed	to	be	entirely	self-evident.	Burk	argues	that	science	alone	cannot	unequivocally	answer	even	the	question:	“what	is	a	gene”?	He	questions	the	“products	of	nature”	doctrine	in	U.S.	patent	law	by	pointing	out	that	the	“gene”	itself	does	not	exist	in	nature;	it	is	one	of	many	possible	human	conceptual	designations	for	delineating	some	parts	of	biological	organisms.		
Controversy		 STS	scholars	view	scientific	controversies	as	breaches	in	the	established	social	order	of	science,	and	thus	strategic	research	sites	from	which	to	observe	scientific	knowledge	in	the	making.	LSS	scholars	have	begun	drawing	attention	to	“hybrid”	(Lynch	et	al	2008,	p.	43)	controversies	that	are	both	scientific	and	legal	(e.g.,	Alder	2007,	Freudenburg	2005,	Freudenburg	2008,	Rees	2015,	van	Brakel	&	De	Hert	2011).	Lynch	et	al.’s	(2008)	study	of	the	controversy	over	forensic	DNA	profiling	begins	from	an	STS	approach	in	which	the	explanation	for	reaching	closure—that	is,	general	agreement	in	a	“core	set,”	a	relatively	small	group	of	individuals	whose	expertise	lies	closest	to	the	subject	matter—is	social	rather	than	purely	natural.	They	then	draw	on	Edmond’s	(2001)	work	extending	the	notion	of	the	core	set	into	the	“law-set,”	a	core	set	composed	of	both	scientific	and	legal	actors,	to	which	Lynch	et	al.	add	a	“literary	set”	of	legal	scholars,	science	journalists,	and	social	scientists	like	themselves.	They	approach	the	DNA	controversy	as	“a	techno-legal	controversy,”	arguing	that	“[c]losure	was	as	much	a	legal	and	
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administrative	matter	as	it	was	a	technical	or	scientific	issue”	(Lynch	et	al	2008,	pp.	45-46)	(see	also	Aronson	2007).	Aronson	and	Cole	(2009,	Cole	&	Aronson	2009)	bring	an	STS	perspective	to	the	use	of	science	as	a	rhetorical	resource	in	debates	over	the	death	penalty	in	the	United	States.	Through	a	series	of	three	case	studies—the	use	of	DNA	profiling	to	show	that	factually	innocent	people	are	sentenced	to	death,	the	appeal	to	psychological	knowledge	to	support	the	argument	that	the	juvenile	brain	is	not	fully	formed	and	therefore	should	be	considered	less	culpable,	and	the	use	of	medical	knowledge	in	debates	over	whether	lethal	injection	execution	causes	undue	pain—they	show	that	the	appealing	notion	of	invoking	science	in	these	controversies	also	invites	peril.	Scientific	knowledge	should	be	expected	to	change,	and	even	the	same	scientific	data	may	be	subject	to	alternative	explanations.	Ottinger’s	(2013)	study	of	environmental	justice	uses	STS	to	challenge	cherished	procedural	justice	notions	like	informed	consent	and	informed	participation.	A	common	theme	in	her	work,	as	well	as	in	controversy	studies	more	generally,	is	the	point	that	since	scientific	knowledge	is	dynamic,	it	becomes	difficult	to	hold	it	temporally	stable	enough	to	determine	legal	questions	like	whether	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	DNA	“match,”	or	whether	legally	actionable	scarcity	exists	(see	also	Alatout	2007),	or	whether	consent	was	“informed.”	
Expertise		 One	area	where	science	in	law	becomes	particularly	visible	lies	in	the	necessity	of	adjudicating	the	legal	admissibility	of	scientific	(or	expert)	evidence.	Law,	in	some	jurisdictions	at	some	times,	has	seen	this	necessity	as	a	call	for	
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“demarcation”—that	is,	distinguishing	true	science	from	pseudo-science	and	other	pretenders	(Golan	2004).		One	particularly	well-studied	example	of	demarcation	is	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	opinion	Daubert	v.	Merrell	Dow	Pharmaceuticals	(1993).	Although	
Daubert	did	cite	some	STS	work,	it	generally	approached	admissibility	from	a	perspective	informed	by	Popperian	philosophy	of	science,	which	holds	that	the	proper	goal	is	demarcation	and	the	proper	tool	with	which	to	do	it	is	a	philosophical	principle	called	“falsification.”	Daubert	thus	results	in	a	crude	binary	framework	in	which	purported	scientific	knowledge	claims	are	sorted	into	two	categories:	“true	science”	and	“junk.”	Witnesses	representing	true	science	are	then	given	free	reign	to	make	pretty	much	any	statements	they	want,	while	witnesses	representing	junk	science	are	not	permitted	to	say	anything,	no	matter	how	epistemologically	humble	(Cole	2007).		STS	scholars	have	critiqued	Daubert	for	its	mythologized	notions	of	a	unitary	science	that	can	be	fully	accounted	for	by	falsification,	as	well	as	its	hubristic	claim	of	an	objective	standpoint	from	which	to	engage	in	demarcation	(Edmond	&	Mercer	1998a,	Edmond	&	Mercer	1998b,	Edmond	&	Mercer	2002,	Edmond	&	Mercer	2004,	for	a	contrary	view,	see	Jasanoff	1995,	p.	63).	STS	scholars’	efforts	to	articulate	what	an	STS-inflected	legal	standard	for	evaluating	expert	evidence	would	look	like	illustrates	the	differences	between	STS	and	approaches	like	falsification.	Such	a	standard,	they	suggest,	would	be	ethnographic,	contextual,	critically	reflective,	non-idealized,	and	non-romantic	(Caudill	2002a,	Caudill	2002b,	Caudill	&	LaRue	2003,	
DRAFT	–	PLEASE	DO	NOT	COPY,	CITE,	OR	CIRCULATE	
	 16	
Caudill	&	LaRue	2006,	Caudill	&	Redding	2000,	Edmond	&	Roach	2011,	LaRue	&	Caudill	2004).	Jasanoff	(2005,	2006),	however,	argues	that	scholars	may	be	asking	the	wrong	question.	Rather	than	ask	how	to	properly	evaluate	science,	she	argues	that	the	question	should	be	approached	pragmatically:	how	best	can	law	do	justice	under	conditions	of	scientific	uncertainty?	Indeed,	while	STS	has	been	criticized	as	an	undifferentiated	debunking	of	all	knowledge	claims	(e.g.,	Wolpert	1993,	p.	110),	much	recent	STS	work	has	engaged	the	question	of	how	to	move	forward	with	technical	decision-making	in	a	world	in	which	the	insights	of	STS	are	taken	for	granted.	It	asks:	Without	either	leveling	all	knowledge	claims	as	equal,	on	the	one	hand,	or	uncritically	privileging	certain	knowledge	claims	on	the	other,	how	can	social	groups	make	technical	decisions	in	a	world	of	scientific	uncertainty	(e.g.,	Collins	&	Evans	2007,	Jasanoff	2003,	Rip	2003,	Wynne	2003)?		Forensic	science	turns	out	to	be	an	area	in	which	STS	scholars	have	engaged	this	problem	(e.g.,	Cole	2010,	Dioso‐Villa	2016,	Mnookin	2008).	In	Risinger’s	(2007,	p.	688)	sympathetic	reading,	STS-influenced	scholars	discovered	that	many	knowledge	claims	in	the	realm	generally	known	as	“forensic	science”	were	“insupportable	not	merely	in	the	same	sense	that	.	.	.	science	studies	.	.	.	may	assume	that	all	claims	are	ultimately	insupportable,	but	insupportable	in	a	more	fundamental	and	important	way.”	
Legal	Knowledge			 Another	set	of	analyses	examines	the	role	of	law	in	generating	what	is	taken	to	be	scientific	knowledge.	Cole’s	(2004)	debunking	of	the	assumed	fact	of	the	
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absolute	accuracy	of	fingerprint	identification	also	notes	the	role	that	law	itself	played	in	constructing	this	“fact.”	Cunliffe	(2011,	p.	199)	finds	similar	invoking	of	law	in	support	of	medical	facts	about	infant	death	and,	further,	that	legal	cases	sometimes	drove	medical	research	in	this	area.	Lawless	(2012)	makes	a	similar	argument	about	a	possibly	novel—the	very	issue	of	novelty	was	subject	to	intense	debate—application	of	DNA	profiling:	low-template	DNA	profiling	(LT-DNA).	Mnookin	(1998)	shows	that	the	seemingly	unproblematic	claim	that	photographs	constituted	faithful	representations	of	reality	were	not	simply	accepted	by	courts,	but	had	to	be	tamed	and	fitted	into	familiar	legal	doctrine.			 This	making	of	scientific	knowledge	by	law	is	only	one	usage	of	the	rather	flexible	and	ambiguous	term	“legal	knowledge.”	Other	researchers	study	the	making	of	legal	knowledge,	by	which	they	mean	“those	multiple,	collective,	medico-administrative	and	managerial	decisions	about	knowledge	itself	that	precede	official	legal	decisions,”	and	also,	like	much	STS	scholarship,	“the	various	uses	people	make	of	a	law’s	perceived	set	of	tools,	forms,	idioms	and	styles	of	reasoning”	(Jacob	2011,	pp.	245-46).	Focusing	on	this	latter	form,	Riles	(2011)	offers	an	ethnographic	study	of	the	Bank	of	Japan.	Looking	carefully	at	the	collateral	that	acts	as	security	for	a	loan,	Riles	examines	what	she	calls	“collateral	knowledge”:	a	knowledge	that	practitioners	view	“as	of	no	particular	consequence	or	worry”	but	which	Riles	sees	as	instrumental	in	bringing	new	forms	of	governance	into	being.	She	emphasizes	the	importance	of	legal	reasoning	in	the	financial	markets	and	transactions—reasoning	that	helped	to	transform	collateral	from	“just	a	technique”	to	something	that	took	on	a	“cultural	reality”	of	its	own	(pp.	173-74).	Similarly,	Kawar	(2014)	emphasizes	the	
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importance	of	material	practices,	such	as	charts,	questionnaires,	and	“split	paragraphs”—dividing	paragraphs	of	legal	documents	into	smaller	parts	that	can	be	negotiated	and	treated	differentially—in	the	making	of	rights	for	domestic	workers	in	international	law.	Jain	(2006)	notes	that	the	archive	she	mined	for	her	study	of	the	short-handled	hoe,	and	even	the	artifact	of	the	hoe	itself,	were	in	some	sense	created	by	law.	Scheffer	(2010,	p.	623),	in	his	study	of	psychologist	experts,	argues	that	such	experts	expand	their	authority	through	performances	of	borrowing	and	sharing	diverse	knowledge	from	others—establishing	their	role	not	through	knowing	everything	but,	instead,	through	the	“modest	acts”	of	claiming	not	to	know	some	things.		
Common	Knowledge			 Some	LSS	scholars	apply	these	approaches	to	knowledge	that	is	not	necessarily	scientific	in	a	conventional	sense.	For	example,	in	their	study	of	liquor	licensing	and	drunk	driving,	Levi	and	Valverde	(2001)	approach	police	science	much	in	the	way	STS	approaches	scientific	knowledge.	Their	comparison	of	“common”	versus	professional	knowledge	mirrors	STS	work	on	the	expert	knowledge	of	non-professionals,	such	as	farmers	or	AIDS	patients—an	approach	applied	to	several	other	“common”	and	“hybrid”	knowledges	in	Valverde	(2003)—	which	essentially	takes	an	STS	approach	to	“nonscientific	knowledges	in	legal	contexts”	(3,	emphasis	added)	(see	also	Allen	2004).	
Co-Production		
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	 The	focus	on	the	interaction	of	scientific	and	legal	knowledge	can	be	pushed	further	through	the	notion	of	“co-production”	(Jasanoff	1995,	p.	xv,	Jasanoff	2011,	p.	3).	Those	ascribing	to	the	notion	of	co-production	hold	that	it	would	be	fruitless	to	try	to	isolate	the	effect	of	law	on	scientific	knowledge	or	the	effect	of	science	on	legal	knowledge;	it	is	better	to	analyze	the	process	through	which	they	produce	one	another.		 Mnookin	(2001,	p.	114),	for	example,	notes	that	most	legal	evidence	scholars,	despite	other	differences,	tend	to	“share	a	belief	that	scientific	reliability	is	generated	entirely	outside	of	law,	rather	than	partly	constituted	through	legal	determinations.”	In	her	study	of	handwriting	evidence,	she	shows	that	law,	in	the	form	of	judicial	opinions,	played	an	important	role	in	constructing	the	supposed	scientific	reliability	of	handwriting	analysis.	Moreover,	the	law’s	conception	of	what	was	meant	by	“scientific	reliability”	shaped	handwriting	analysts’	conception	of	their	own	expertise.	Thus,	“[t]he	reliability	of	expert	evidence	in	handwriting	was	co-produced	by	judges	and	experts	in	tandem”	(pp.	121-22)	(see	also	Balmer	2015,	M'charek	2008,	Toom	2012).	In	addition	to	its	applications	to	forensic	science,	co-production	is	particularly	attractive	to	scholars	studying	regulation	(e.g.,	Kirkland	2016),	perhaps	because	the	field	has	historically	treated	law	and	science	as	so	clearly	separate:	law	regulating	science.	Bora	(2008,	pp.	68-69)	notes	that	the	field	of	“science	advice”	has	historically	been	treated	as	the	opposite	binary:	science	advising	law	(or,	more	generally,	government).	He	argues	that	both	could	benefit	from	a	co-productionist	
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approach.	Winickoff	(2015,	pp.	174-75)	applies	co-production	to	regulation,	arguing	that	regulatory	science	can	even	co-produce	a	new	“jurisdictional	architecture.”	
ANALOGY			 Legal	scholars	long	have	questioned	whether	law	exists	as	an	autonomous	discipline	(Holmes	2009,	Posner	1987),	but	such	skepticism	says	little	about	what	law	is.	The	act	of	defining	law,	it	turns	out,	“is	surprisingly	tricky	business”	(Calavita	2010,	p.	24).	Some	try	to	avoid	this	definitional	quagmire	altogether.	Rather	than	defining	law,	they	analogize	it;	and	science	is	the	most	frequent	comparison	they	invoke	(Langdell	1887,	Latour	2010).	Indeed,	as	Horwitz	(1980)	notes,	the	idea	of	law	as	science	“has	dominated	American	legal	thought”	for	much	of	the	last	two	centuries.	For	those	LSS	scholars	who	see	law	as	science,	STS	provides	a	convenient	toolkit	for	studying	law	and	its	implementation	(Davis	et	al	2012),	but	the	comparison	to	science	need	not	be	explicit.	Often,	LSS	scholars	cite	STS	as	a	significant	influence,	but	offer	little	elaboration	of	either	STS	or	how	it	has	influenced	their	work	(e.g.,	Braverman	2008,	Guzik	2013,	Suchman	2003,	Tejani	2016).	Still	other	scholars	borrow	STS	concerns	and	concepts	and	directly	apply	them	to	their	studies	of	law.	We	examine	these	applications	below.		
Actor-Network	Theory		 Actor-network	theory	(ANT),	generally	credited	to	Callon	(1984),	Law	(1987),	and	Latour	(1987),	is	by	far	the	best-known	STS	concept	outside	of	the	field	of	STS,	and	it	is	the	most	frequent	STS	concept	imported	into	LSS.	Indeed,	many	LSS	scholars	equate	STS	with	ANT,	and	more	specifically	with	a	single	scholar,	Bruno	
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Latour.	ANT	is	an	end-product	of—or	an	unfortunate	distraction	from—the	social	constructivist	project	in	science.	Within	STS,	ANT	was	arguably	a	product	of	the	same	“theoretical	exhaustion”	that	LSS	encountered	after	showing	that	law	and	culture,	or	law	and	society,	were	mutually	and	socially	constructed	(Maurer	2004);	but	within	LSS,	some	see	ANT	as	promising	something	distinct	and	new.	ANT	argues	for	doing	away	with	the	nature-society	divide	entirely,	for	analytically	treating	everything	as	an	actor—rechristened	“actant”	to	signal	the	inclusion	of	non-human	participants—without	being	distracted	by	the	“outmoded”	question	of	whether	the	“thing”	is	natural	or	social	(Latour	1987,	p.	84).	Famously,	this	leads	to	the	treating	of	machines,	bureaucracies,	documents,	and	even	scallops	and	microbes	as	actants.	Hence,	ANT	is	sometimes	summarized	as	“scallops	have	agency.”	Rather	than	attending	to	the	nature-society	divide,	the	social	scientist	is	advised	to	study	the	networks	between	actants	that	see—or	make—the	world	in	a	consistent	way.	In	the	language	of	ANT,	“scientific	facts,”	“action,”	or	“reality”	are	in	a	sense	“made”	by	actants	who	“enroll”	or	mobilize	the	strongest	networks.	This	emphasis	on	strength,	rather	than,	say,	truth,	invites	the	common	characterization	of	ANT	as	Machiavellian.		 ANT	is	(or	was)	one	of	those	trendy	academic	ideas	that	gets	new	adherents	excited	and	irritates	skeptics.	Even	within	STS,	ANT	is	controversial;	many,	including	some	of	its	own	founders,	have	questioned	its	claim	to	being	a	theory	and	suggest	that	it	may	have	outlived	its	usefulness	(e.g.,	Latour	2004,	Law	&	Hassard	1999).	In	LSS,	ANT	has	been	adopted	mostly	as	a	method:	a	way	of	following	the	disparate	people	and	materials	that	comprise	law.		It	is	regarded	as	a	“tool,”	not	a	
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theory:	a	hoped-for	means	of	“stimulat[ing]	methodological	innovation	through	analyses	that	ask	not	about	the	content	of	claims	but	about	process	and	flow—about	how	actors	pick	through	documents	or	discourses	and	cobble	together	new	governing	machines	that	recycle	old	bits	in	new	ways”	(Valverde	2005,	pp.	420-21).		One	curious	feature	of	efforts	to	apply	ANT	to	LSS	is	that	such	efforts	have	in	some	sense	been	upstaged	by	one	of	the	founders	of	ANT	himself.	Latour’s	(2002)	book,	La	Fabrique	du	Droit	[The	Making	of	Law]	studies	law	by	focusing	on	its	most	visible	manifestations:	“the	wonderfully	kitsch	frescoes	.	.	.	.	the	fattening	of	files	in	grey	or	yellow	folders	.	.	.	.	the	hesitations,	the	winding	path,	the	meanders	of	reflexivity	[in	the	counsellors’	discussions]”	(1,	69,	151).		For	Latour,	law	is	“a	practice,	a	situated	material	practice	that	ties	a	whole	range	of	heterogeneous	phenomena	in	a	certain	specific	way”	(x).		The	cases	that	present	themselves	at	the	Conseil	d’Etat	offer	an	opportunity	for	the	counsellors	to	identify	and	describe	the	“way”	of	law.		 The	Making	of	Law	was,	however,	unavailable	in	English	for	eight	years.	During	this	interregnum,	Levi	and	Valverde	(2008)	raised	awareness	of	ANT	for	“non-French-reading”	LSS	scholars	with	an	essay	that	summarized	La	Fabrique	du	
Droit’s	methodological	and	theoretical	implications	for	LSS	research.	They	saw	its	principal	values	as:	first,	its	rejection	of	the	duality	of	law	and	society	in	favor	of	an	ANT	approach	that	“treats	law	as	a	network	of	people	and	of	things	in	which	legality	is	not	a	field	to	be	studied	independently,	but	is	instead	a	way	in	which	the	world	is	assembled”	(806);	and,	consequently,	its	rigorous	commitment	to	ethnographic	empiricism	in	order	to	generate	“specific,	concrete	analyses	that	attempt	to	be	as	
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dynamic	and	as	sensitive	to	contingency	as	the	processes	being	analyzed”	(812).	They	suggest	that	“the	revival	of	a	pragmatist	tradition	through	ANT	can	provide	analytic	insights	to	complement	existing	theoretical	and	methodological	tools”	(822).		 ANT’s	adherents	thus	celebrate	it	as	a	way	to	study	law	dynamically,	drawing	attention	to	law	as	a	practice	enacted	by	people	and	things,	rather	than	as	a	power	that	controls	those	people	and	things	(Cloatre	2008,	Cloatre	&	Wright	2012).	Thus,	for	example,	Lange’s	(2005)	study	of	legal	regulation	uses	ANT	to	move	beyond	obsession	with	disentangling	the	relative	contributions	of	agency	and	structure,	and	instead	treats	everything,	including	technology	and	material	objects,	as	agents.	When	ANT	is	used	in	LSS,	then,	it	is	not	to	record	perceptions	of	law	or	analyze	law’s	effects;	it	often	skips	over	these	classic	sociolegal	preoccupations.		Instead,	ANT-inspired	studies	more	closely	resemble	mapping	projects:	they	follow	the	process	and	flow	of	actants	to	plot	who	and	what	is	involved	in	the	making	of	laws	and	regulations	(e.g.,	Rooke	et	al	2012).		Cowan	and	Carr	(2008)	make	this	point	explicitly	in	their	study	of	legal	challenges	mounted	by	landlord	associations	in	Ireland.	They	extol	ANT	for	allowing	them	to	eschew	the	perceived	binaries	of	power	and	resistance,	governable	and	ungovernable.	Instead,	using	an	ANT-inspired	methodology,	they	follow	the	networks	established	within	and	by	the	associations,	highlighting	concerns	that	might	otherwise	have	seemed	marginal.	Acknowledging	that	it	becomes	difficult	to	know	where	to	cut	the	network,	Cowan	and	Carr	(2008,	p.	166)	conclude	that	following	the	network	ultimately	is	a	“methodological	limitation[]	as	well	as	strength[]”	of	ANT.		
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	 Following	the	network	is,	as	Latour	puts	it,	a	quest	for	the	ontology	of	law,	the	search	for	law’s	“essence”	(x),	its	“mode	of	existence”	(274),	or,	more	to	the	point,	its	“libido	judicandi”	(204).	Law	is	defined	as	strategically	positioned	networks,	allying	human	and	non-human	actants,	and	extending	well	beyond	the	confines	of	formal	institutions.	These	networks	connect	and	bind	disparate	and	seemingly	unrelated	things,	documents,	and	people.	Latour	characterizes	this	as	formatting;	“the	law,”	he	pronounces,	“formats”	(268).	For	connoisseurs	of	law,	this	is	a	marvelous	observation:		Law	coheres;	it	does	not	impose.		This	conclusion	also	reveals	the	limits	of	ANT	in	law,	for	this	sort	of	mapping	exercise	does	little	to	navigate	one	through	the	theoretical	thickets	of	legitimacy,	obeisance,	and	power	that	are	the	“standard	fare	of	sociolegal	research”	(Levi	and	Valverde	2008,	822).		After	tracing	the	paths	of	law,	then	what?		
Ethnography		 For	many	scholars,	this	unanswered—possibly	unanswerable—question	poses	a	source	of	frustration	and	cause	for	spurning	ANT.	Even	for	these	scholars,	however,	Latour’s	contribution	to	the	study	of	law	remains	a	source	of	inspiration,	particularly	in	his	“revival	of	a	pragmatist	tradition,”	which	encourages	scholars	to	study	law	through	a	“deeply	empiricist”	ethnography—one	that	discusses	not	law	that	has	been	made	but,	rather,	“law	in	the	making”	(Levi	&	Valverde	2008,	p.	822).		While	LSS	embraced	ethnography	prior	to	discovering	STS,	researchers	who	combine	ethnographic	and	STS	perspectives	offer	special	insight	into	the	technology—not	just	the	effects—of	law.	
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The	commitment	to	ethnography	as	a	means	to	study	law	as	and	through	practice—albeit	not	always	explicitly	following	Latour—has	influenced	a	growing	number	of	studies	of	law	and	legal	regulation.	Thus,	for	example,	Van	Hoyweghen	et	al.	(2007,	p.	181)	aim	to	discover	the	“practical	effects”	of	Belgian	insurance	law	by	studying	the	effects	of	such	law	through	ethnographic	fieldwork	“from	the	inside”	of	Belgian	insurance	companies.	They	conceptualize	the	legislation	through	the	STS	concept	of	“socio-technique,”	by	which	they	mean	that	science	and	society	(including	legislation)	are	co-produced	(181).	Through	ethnographic	detail,	their	work	draws	attention	to	the	mechanics,	as	well	as	the	effects,	of	this	co-production.		Ethnographic	methods	and	analysis	are	especially	useful	for	producing	interpretive	accounts	of	legal	practice,	and	for	illuminating	the	dynamics	of	legal	knowledge	(e.g.,	Gundhus	2012,	Ottinger	2013,	Riles	2011,	Valverde	et	al	2003).	Riles	(1998)	uses	ethnography	to	examine	the	legal	agreements	negotiated	at	a	United	Nations	sponsored	international	conference	and	asks	how	legal	norms	are	made	visible	to	participants	(and	to	the	anthropologist	who	studies	them).	Borrowing	a	page	from	STS,	Riles	answers	this	question	by	focusing	on	the	material	manifestations	of	legal	negotiation:	the	changes	made	and	negotiated	in	written	documents.	She	implies	that,	like	scientific	knowledge,	legal	knowledge	may	be	ascertained	through	observation	of	the	practices	and	instruments	of	those	who	might	be	said	to	be	“doing”	law.	Bertenthal		uses	ethnographic	research	and	analysis	of	meetings	between	unrepresented	litigants	and	attorneys	offering	advice	in	a	legal	self-help	clinic	to	examine	the	production	of	legal	literacy—specifically,	the	process	through	which	legal	understanding	is	developed	and	articulated	through	the	reading	
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and	writing	of	legal	documents.	Kruse	(2016)	also	uses	documents	to	trace	the	“social	life	of	forensic	evidence”	backwards	from	the	courtroom	through	the	forensic	laboratory	to	its	origin	at	the	crime	scene.	
Materiality		 The	materiality	of	law	is	an	especially	pervasive	theme	in	studies	of	law	that	draw	inspiration	from	STS.	The	focus	on	law’s	matter	does	not,	of	course,	draw	exclusively	from	STS;	but,	as	a	field	that	“increasingly	recognize[s]	materiality	as	pertinent	to	social	inquiry”	(DeSoucey	&	Schleifer	2010),	STS	makes	available	several	analytic	tools	to	LSS	scholars	interested	in	the	materiality	in	and	of	law.		Among	the	insights	LSS	scholars	have	borrowed	from	STS	is	the	recognition	that	objects	do	not	merely	exist	as	things	in	the	world,	but	must	be	understood—and	perhaps	even	redefined—according	to	what	they	do	within	the	world	(see	Madison	2005)	as	residues	of	legal	action	that	“lead[]	forward	as	well	as	into	the	past”	(Merry	&	Coutin	2014,	p.	3).		Such	redefinition	is	necessary,	Riles	(2011)	suggests,	because	objects	in	law	are	not	simply	neutral	and	agnostic	tools,	but,	rather,	potent	vehicles	for	the	implementation	of	law	in	society,	with	potentially	profound	distributive	consequences.	Thus,	Hunter	(2015)	proposes	studying	things	within	law	as	“socio-legal	objects”	to	emphasize	the	imbrication	of	objects,	legal	processes,	and	social	relationships.		In	tracing	disputes	over	solar	leases	in	the	United	Kingdom,	she	urges	closer	attention	to	the	written	lease	as	a	particular	kind	of	object	that	creates	a	particular	social	reality	through	its	existence,	use,	and	action	within	law.	Other	scholars	have	looked	more	closely	at	the	contours	of	what	Hunter	calls	“socio-legal	realities”	(154),	and,	especially,	the	import	of	objects	in	constructing	
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these	realities.		Many	LSS	scholars	treat	law	as	a	“regime	of	enunciation”	(Pottage	2012),	which	should	be	studied	through	attention	to	specific	language	and	rhetoric.		By	calling	attention	to	the	role	of	things,	however,	the	STS	approach	extends	the	LSS	inquiry	beyond	discourse,	drawing	attention	to	the	role	of	machines	(Pottage	2011),	regulations	(Faulkner	2012),	physical	landscapes	(Levi	2009),	and	regulated	entities	such	as	food	products	(DeSoucey	&	Schleifer	2010)	in	the	enactment	of	law.		Latour’s	interest	in	“immutable	mobiles,”	which	can	move	objects	across	time	and	space	while	keeping	them	stable,	is	discernable	in	Lezaun’s	(2012,	p.	21)	ethnography	of	the	European	Institute	for	Reference	Materials	and	Measurements,	“the	agency	tasked	by	European	authorities		with	the	fabrication	of	dependably	constant	versions	of	the	entities	mentioned	in	EU	legislation.”	The	Institute	is	a	sort	“curiosity	cabinet”	consisting	of	“entities	mentioned,	somewhat	casually,	in	European	laws	and	regulations,	but	which	the	law	would	be	unable	to	find	in	the	world	if	it	were	not	for	the	availability	of	an	official,	stable	version	of	the	material	in	question.”		In	studying	law,	one	should	focus	on	materials	before	speech,	Lezaun	argues,	for	“the	law	does	not	speak	of	the	world	.	.	.	unless	worldly	stuff	can	be	classified	on	the	basis	of	legal	criteria”	(p.	38).		Material	intermediaries	have	the	power	to	transform	legal	criteria	from	mere	pronouncement	to	something	that	is	in	fact	“a	part	of	the	world.”		This	process	of	coming	to	matter,	as	Lezaun	puts	it,	does	not	operate	in	a	vacuum	but	must	be	looked	at	in	conjunction	with	other	actants	in	the	legal	system,	whose	use,	interpretation	of,	and	interaction	with	objects	forms	the	basis	of	a	unique	legal	vision	(van	Oorschot	2014).		Legal	materials,	in	other	words,	
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are	not	just	objects	of	study;	they	are	an	important	component	of	the	technology	that	grounds	law	and	enables	it	to	do	what	it	does.	
Science	Communication		 Science	communication	(sometimes	called	“public	understanding	of	science”)	is	another	semi-autonomous	field	oriented	around	the	eponymous	problem.	Science	communication	overlaps	somewhat	with	the	problem	of	expertise	(see	above)—because	it	raises	the	question	of	public	scientific	competence—but	the	field	is	broader,	encompassing	“consumption”	of	science	for	purposes	other	than	technical	decision-making,	such	as	education	and	entertainment.	The	definitional	project	serves	as	an	important	tool	in	establishing	what	knowledge	counts,	why	it	counts,	and	for	whom	it	counts.	It	is	a	field	in	which	positivist	and	constructivist	perspectives	maintain	an	uneasy	coexistence,	and	STS-inflected	work	occupies	the	constructivist	end	of	this	continuum.		STS	work	understands	itself	in	opposition	to	what	is	derisively	known	as	the	“deficit	model,”	which	holds	that	the	“problem”	is	a	lack	of	scientific	knowledge	on	the	part	of	laypersons	(which	often	includes,	for	example,	legal	actors	or	policymakers).	In	contrast,	STS	work	begins	from	the	premise	that	scientific	knowledge	is	itself	unstable,	ambiguous,	and	contested,	and	thus	cannot	simply	be	poured	into	laypersons’	minds.	STS	work	tends	to	valorize	various	forms	of	lay	knowledge	and	to	call	for	public	participation	and	engagement	in	scientific	knowledge-making	and	technical	decision-making.	This	work	challenges	the	influential	view	that	knowledge	is	made	by	experts,	and	it	presents	some	pathways	
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through	which	those	far	removed	from	the	center	can	also	stake	a	claim	to	scientific	understanding.	Tracking	and	evaluating	public	understandings	of	law	comprises	an	important	part	of	LSS	work	as	well.	The	bulk	of	this	scholarship	uses	a	model	of	meaning-making—commonly	referred	to	as	legal	consciousness	(Ewick	&	Silbey	1998,	Silbey	2005)—consistent	with	conventional	understandings	of	“a	thinker,	a	cognitive	self”	(Engel	1998,	p.	111)	who	adopts	individual	or	cultural	forms	of	knowledge	“through	which	legal	understandings,	expectations,	aspirations,	strategies,	and	choices	are	developed”	(McCann	2006,	p.	xii).	Like	STS,	LSS	work	valorizes	some	forms	of	lay	understanding	of	the	law,	and,	especially,	the	mobilization	of	that	understanding	as	social	action	(Silverstein	1996).			For	those	LSS	scholars	who	see	law	as	analogous	to	science,	STS	provides	a	convenient	toolkit	for	studying	law	and	its	implementation,	including	the	ways	law	is	communicated	and	understood	by	the	public	(e.g.,	Caudill	2011,	Davis	et	al	2012,	Flear	&	Pfister	2014).	Some	STS	work	on	science	communication	gravitated	toward	normative	advocacy	of	“public	participation”	in	science:	e.g.,	stakeholder	consensus	conferences,	citizen	science.	Flear	and	Pickersgill	(2013)	draw	from	STS	work	on	public	participation	in	their	study	of	the	EU’s	regulation	of	nanotechnology.	They	ask	how	citizens	can	participate	in	such	regulation	in	the	absence	of	certain	scientific	knowledge,	but	also,	what	such	participation	might	do.	They	observe	that	“public	participation	is	a	key	site	where	debate	around	futures	is	played	out”	since	those	futures	“can	literally	be	talked	into	existence”	(p.	13).	This	public	discursive	interaction	creates,	among	other	things,	new	configurations	of	science/citizen	
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relations,	fundamentally	affecting	the	ways	in	which	people	and	things	both	regulate	and	are	regulated	by	law.	In	characteristic	fashion,	however,	STS	quickly	turned	its	critical	eye	on	such	enterprises	for	offering	only	faux	participation	and	serving	entrenched	interests.	LSS	might	benefit	from	a	similarly	skeptical	perspective,	subjecting	even	well-intended	public	participation	programs	to	analysis	and	critique.	
Reflexivity		 “Reflexivity,”	the	notion	that	STS’s	social	understanding	of	scientific	knowledge	must	be	applied	to	STS	itself,	is	considered	by	many	to	be	a	core	principle	of	STS;	it	is	indeed	one	of	the	four	principles	of	the	famous	“strong	programme	in	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge”	(Bloor	1991).	The	principle	makes	sense,	of	course,	but	it	has	been	criticized	even	within	STS,	in	part	for	being	perhaps	impossible	to	enact	(Ashmore	1989).	Reflexivity	has	relevance	for	LSS,	which,	like	STS,	has	aspirations	to	producing	social	scientific	knowledge	at	the	same	time	that	it	studies	truth-makers	of	other	kinds.	It	echoes	earlier	interventions	into	law	and	society,	especially	Teubner’s	(1983)	call	for	a	more	reflexive	law.	In	some	ways,	Teubner’s	concept	of	reflexive	law	echoes	the	strong	programme.	Reflexivity	is	meant	to	be	a	restraining	mechanism	on	law,	requiring	“the	legal	system	to	view	itself	as	a	system-in-an-environment	and	to	take	account	of	the	limits	of	its	own	capacity	as	it	attempts	to	regulate	the	functions	and	performances	of	other	social	subsystems”	(p.	280,	citations	omitted).	Yet,	unlike	the	strong	programme,	Teubner’s	concept	of	reflexivity	was	concerned	with	the	subject	of	knowledge—law—rather	than	the	
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making	of	that	knowledge.	STS	would	propose	reflexivity	in	the	study	of	law	and	society,	not	only	reflexivity	in	the	legal	system	itself.	Even	as	some	LSS	scholars	have	absorbed	STS,	LSS	remains	influenced	by	strong	strains	of	what	STS	would	consider	un-reflexive	scientism	and	positivism.	Some	argue	that	“scientism,”	which	has	been	defined	as	“a	matter	of	putting	too	high	a	value	on	natural	science	in	comparison	with	other	branches	of	learning	or	culture”	(Sorell	1991,	p.	i),	invites	social	scientists	to	try	to	imitate	the	certitude	that	they	imagine	the	natural	sciences	can	command	(see,	e.g.,	Calavita	2002).	LSS	has	always	produced	its	own	social	scientific	facts,	of	varying	types	and	accompanied	by	varying	degrees	of	rhetorical	conviction,	and	the	present	is	no	different.	Indeed,	given	the	growing	presence	of	social	science	methods	and	training	in	the	legal	academy,	we	should	expect	to	see	increased	knowledge-making	in	LSS.	STS	shouldn’t	necessarily	teach	LSS	never	to	make	such	claims,	but	it	might	teach	LSS	to	at	least	think	about	the	principle	of	reflexivity	when	they	are	made.	It	is	not	so	much	that	LSS	scholars	need	to	think	about	whether	the	claims	are	true.	Rather,	STS	would	urge	them	to	think	about	their	own	knowledge	claims	as	they	would	those	of	others,	as	contingent	and	socially	produced.	Likewise,	STS	would	encourage	them	ask	the	same	questions	about	their	own	knowledge	claims	as	they	would	ask	about	others’	claims:	What	social	forces	went	into	the	making	of	these	claims?	Whose	interests	does	it	serve	to	make	them	facts,	and	how	did	that	happen?	Why	does	this	claim	have	purchase	in	this	particular	place	and	time?	And,	above	all,	how	to	respond	to	these	questions	following	the	STS	directive	that	they	cannot	be	answered:	“because	it’s	true”?		
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It	is	often	argued	that	truly	reflexive	scholarship	leads	to	scholarly	paralysis.	But	STS	has	been	able	to	move	forward	by	remaining	modestly,	if	not	fully,	reflexive.	STS	has	had	vigorous	debates	over	the	issue	of	intervening	in	the	scientific	controversies	it	studies,	and	persuasive	arguments	have	been	made	for	various	purist	positions	(e.g.,	STS	scholars	should	never	take	sides;	should	take	the	side	of	politico-moral	underdogs;	should	take	the	side	of	epistemological	losers;	etc.).	For	many	STS	scholars,	however,	the	challenge	is	precisely	how	to	intervene	while	maintaining	some	degree	of	reflexivity.	Reflexivity	also	may	be	found	in	some	LSS	work.	One	example	is	Valverde’s	reflections	on	her	work	as	an	expert	witness	on	the	social	construction	of	sexuality.	She	describes	conforming	to	legal	requirements	about	how	she	presented	herself	and	her	knowledge;	trying	to	balance	“intellectual	integrity”	with	the	urge	to	present	“the	kind	of	social	science	I	instinctively	knew	the	law	wanted”	(Valverde	1996,	p.	208);	making	“problematic	move[s]”	(Valverde	2003,	p.	115);	and	ending	up	becoming	a	purveyor	of	precisely	the	sort	of	“common	knowledge”	she	herself	studies	(p.	135)	(see	also	Cole	2009,	Lynch	2009,	Lynch	&	Cole	2005).	
CONCLUSION			 STS	is	sometimes	portrayed	as	a	theoretical	intervention	into	LSS.	Our	review	of	the	literature	paints	a	somewhat	different	picture.	Rather	than	a	theory,	STS	seems	to	function	more	like	an	anti-theory	for	LSS.	Rather	than	constituting	a	new	theory,	the	overall	thrust	for	most	LSS	scholars	who	“listen	to	STS”	seems	to	be	to	focus	even	greater	attention	on	the	contingent	details	of	specific	legal	and	
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scientific	practices	in	specific	places	at	specific	times,	at	the	expense	of	abstract	theorizing.	For	example,	STS	calls	for	paying	attention	to	and	questioning	the	details	behind	scientific	“facts”	and	technological	systems	and	artifacts.	It	calls	for	increased	attention	to	the	materiality	of	law,	the	papers,	objects,	and	places	that	compose	it.	It	endorses	ethnography	and	thick	description.	Even	actor-network	“theory”	seems	to	be	less	a	theory	than	a	call	to	carefully	reconstruct,	trace,	and	analyze	socio-technical-legal	networks.		 As	noted,	there	are	many	versions,	and	visions,	of	STS.	But	among	the	more	compelling	is	an	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	a	thorough	understanding	of	the	details	behind	the	making	of	scientific	facts	and	technological	artifacts—opening	“black-boxes,”	tracing	networks,	studying	controversies,	and	so	on.	STS	at	its	best	has	this	character,	and	perhaps	STS	can	lend	more	such	character	to	LSS,	not	least	by	dissuading	scholars	from	treating	at	least	one	aspect	of	the	landscape	in	which	law	operates—science	and	technology—as	something	that	can	be	summarily	accounted	for	without	being	carefully	engaged,	considered,	and	questioned.		A	longstanding	STS	argument	has	been	that	even	if	science	does	not	conform	to	its	romantic	idealizations,	it	can	still	be	both	powerful	and	interesting	to	study.	Likewise,	we	need	not	accept	law	as	a	science	in	the	Langdellian	sense	to	recognize	that	it	still	remains	a	potent	form	of	knowledge	and	well	worth	studying:	both	in	its	interactions	with,	and	comparisons	to,	science.		 	
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